“To prevent the present heat from dissipating”: Stanley Kubrick and the Marketing of Dr. Strangelove (1964) by Krämer, Peter
 
InMedia
The French Journal of Media Studies 
3 | 2013
Cinema and Marketing
“To prevent the present heat from dissipating”:








Center for Research on the English-Speaking World (CREW)
 
Electronic reference
Peter Krämer, « “To prevent the present heat from dissipating”: Stanley Kubrick and the Marketing of 
Dr. Strangelove (1964) », InMedia [Online], 3 | 2013, Online since 22 April 2013, connection on 08
September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/inmedia/634  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/
inmedia.634 
This text was automatically generated on 8 September 2020.
© InMedia
“To prevent the present heat from
dissipating”: Stanley Kubrick and
the Marketing of Dr. Strangelove
(1964)
Peter Krämer
1 On 7 March 1963, five weeks into principal photography for Dr. Strangelove or:  How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, the film’s director, producer and co-writer
Stanley  Kubrick  wrote  to  Columbia  Pictures  about  the  marketability  of  his  latest
project: 
My original belief that this subject matter would be very commercial, create an almost
unprecedented public and critical reaction, and be possibly the most exploitable film of
recent times, has, I believe, been largely proven by the tremendous success of its
plagiarised cousin Fail-Safe and the very unusual attention which is being given to the
dispute between the two films. ... Naturally, I would like to have the film released as
quickly as possible in order to prevent the present heat from dissipating.1 
2 The “commercial” subject matter of Kubrick’s film was the outbreak of nuclear war.
This topic had already been the focus of several bestselling novels, the latest of which
had been Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler’s Fail-Safe, published in October 1962.2
Because Fail-Safe shared many elements with Peter George’s 1958 novel Two Hours to
Doom (published in the US as Red Alert), on which Dr. Strangelove was based, Kubrick,
George and Columbia had sued Burdick and Wheeler as well  as the film production
company planning to adapt  the novel,  for  plagiarism.3 It  is  this  on-going “dispute”
which generated the  “heat”  that  Kubrick  wanted to  exploit,  when one  might  have
expected him to refer instead to developments in the nuclear confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union, notably the Cuban Missile Crisis of October
1962, which, it was widely perceived, had actually brought the world to the brink of
nuclear war.
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3 In his letter to Columbia, Kubrick acknowledged that the distributor, which had only
taken on Dr. Strangelove a few months earlier in November 1962, needed time “for your
sales and exploitation forces to manage a co-ordinated national release,” and therefore
would have to go “five to six weeks” beyond his preferred release date (which he gave
as 15 August 1963) for the as yet unfinished film: 
If I understand you correctly, your plan is to break the film nationally (...I would
assume in somewhere around 50 cities), so that we can take the most efficient
advantage of heavy national television advertising, national magazine advertising and
the big national magazine breaks [that is, substantial articles about the film, PK] which
have so far been promised by a number of important editors.
4 It is unclear to what extent Columbia was in fact already committed to an expensive
national advertising campaign for Dr.  Strangelove,  but Kubrick here certainly pushed
very strongly for it. Indeed, he acknowledged how unusual this would be by claiming
that the kind of marketing he envisioned for Dr. Strangelove “has never been done on a
national scale.” At the same time, he showed himself to be reasonable and conciliatory
towards Columbia by accepting the unfortunate delay of his film’s release caused by the
extensive preparations necessary for “a co-ordinated national release.” Kubrick’s letter
indicated that he had already embarked on the marketing of his film on his own, by
contacting  magazine  editors  with  a  view  of  securing  publicity  for  his  forthcoming
release.  It  is  also  obvious  that  Kubrick  expected  to  be  involved  very  closely  with
Columbia’s  marketing of  Dr.  Strangelove,  and that  his  ideas  and interests  might  not
always be in line with those of the distributor; Columbia, for example, might not agree
with Kubrick’s estimation of the film’s commercial potential and hence refuse to invest
a lot in its marketing.
5 In this essay, which makes extensive use of archival sources, most notably from the
Stanley  Kubrick  Archive  at  the  University  of  the  Arts  London,  I  examine Kubrick’s
involvement in the marketing of Dr. Strangelove. The first section provides background
information on Kubrick’s early career, which helps to explain how he came to take such
a central role in the film’s marketing. It also deals with the Fail-Safe dispute, which
loomed so large in Kubrick’s thinking, reminding us that, crucially, marketing is about
positioning  a  product  in  relation  to  its  competitors;  in  this  case,  the  aim  was  to
neutralize  the  nearest  competitor  altogether.  The  second  section  explores  the  key
selling points highlighted in advertising materials (including the press book) and in the
publicity surrounding the film. Among these were the serious, topical subject, the film’s
comedic nature, and, last but not least, the famous director himself. This section also
examines the release strategy for the film, discussing its ever shifting release date and
the national dimension of the marketing campaign around the time of the film’s US
release in January 1964. 
 
Stanley Kubrick, Hollywood and Films About the
“Nuclear Nightmare”
6 After working as a staff photographer for Look, one of America’s leading mass market
picture  magazines,  Stanley  Kubrick  moved  into  filmmaking  in  the  early  1950s,
intending from the outset to make films for the major Hollywood studios.4 Even though
he was only in his twenties, he managed to complete two short documentaries and four
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feature films for theatrical release by 1957.5 Kubrick had to gauge what kinds of films
the majors would want to finance and/or distribute, and he settled on the following:
two short documentaries about the everyday lives of interesting people (Day of the Fight
and The Flying Padre, both 1951), two war films (Fear and Desire, 1953, and Paths of Glory,
1957) and two urban crime dramas (Killer’s Kiss, 1955, and The Killing, 1956). Working
closely with various collaborators, Kubrick initiated and developed these projects, then
sought  production  financing  (initially  mostly  derived  from  his  own  savings,  from
relatives, acquaintances and business partners; after his second feature mostly from
the majors) and distribution deals. With the exception of the somewhat experimental
debut feature Fear and Desire (which was released by the arthouse distributor Joseph
Burstyn), all of these films were distributed by major studios (RKO and United Artists).
None of them was particularly successful in commercial terms, but The Killing and Paths
of Glory received considerable critical acclaim. In addition, from the outset of his film
career  Kubrick had used his  press contacts  to  promote himself  in  interviews as  an
independent-minded,  important  new filmmaker  who was  personally  involved in  all
aspects of film production.6 The reputation he built through this self-promotion, and
also of course through his films, helped him gain production finance and distribution
deals; it also became a cornerstone of the films’ marketing and critical reception. In
addition, wherever possible, Kubrick contributed ideas for the marketing of his films,
as when he managed to get the well-known literary critic Mark Van Doren to write an
endorsement for Fear and Desire, which was used in the film’s advertising.7
7 Both The Killing and Paths of Glory were adaptations of novels. Kubrick had been able to
afford  the  film  rights  for  these  novels  because  in  1955  he  had  formed  a  business
partnership  with  the  well-off  producer  James  Harris.  The  Harris-Kubrick  Pictures
Corporation specialized in adaptations and invested increasing amounts of money in
the purchase of film rights for a wide range of novels (most of them dealing with war,
crime or problematic sexual relationships) in the late 1950 and early 1960s.  Among
these novels were two bestsellers published in the US in 1958, Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita
and Peter George’s Red Alert. One of the key advantages of adapting bestsellers is, of
course, that the success of the book has done a lot of the groundwork for the marketing
of the film to be made from it; to some extent future film audiences can be assumed to
be already familiar with, and interested in, the story’s title and subject matter. This
does  not  only  help  the  distributor  with  advertising  and  publicizing  the  film  to
audiences, but it also helps independent producers in their negotiations with financiers
and distributors. Kubrick and Harris nevertheless had difficulties making a deal for the
production of Lolita,  because they insisted on high levels of control over the project
which the majors were not willing to grant. As a consequence of the delay of the Lolita
project and also of the business relationship he had established with Kirk Douglas (who
starred in Paths of Glory which Kubrick had made for his production company Bryna),
Kubrick was willing to take over the direction of Spartacus (1960), after Douglas–who
starred in the film and whose company produced it–had fired the original  director
Anthony Mann. Somewhat ironically, the huge commercial and critical success of this
mega-budget  film–which  Kubrick  had  comparatively  little  control  over–finally
established him as an important player in Hollywood. 
8 Even before  Spartacus was  released  in  October  1960,  Harris-Kubrick  Pictures  finally
managed to get financing (but not yet a distribution agreement) for Lolita through a
deal with Seven Arts, an important telefilm distribution company which was entering
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the field of movie production at that time.8 Seven Arts eventually released the film
through MGM in June 1962, and agreed also to finance Harris-Kubrick Pictures’ next
project, which the company’s annual report, in July 1962, described as “a satirical view
of  The  Bomb.”9 This  project  fit  in  well  with  Kubrick’s  preoccupation  with  military
organizations and combat in his early work, escalating from the small scale attacks of
four soldiers caught behind enemy lines in an unspecified war (Fear and Desire) and the
stalemate of trench warfare on a section of the Franco-German front in World War I
(Paths  of  Glory)  to  battles  between rebellious  slaves  and the  Roman army sweeping
across the Roman empire (Spartacus)–and now the possible destruction of humankind
in a nuclear war.
9 In an article he published in 1963–as part of the extensive pre-release publicity for Dr.
Strangelove–Kubrick explained that he had long had a “great desire to do something
about  the  nuclear  nightmare,”  reading  dozens  of  books  about  the  subject  and
eventually–after a recommendation from a British nuclear strategist–choosing Red Alert
as the main source for his film.10 However, during script development he realized that
the  adaptation  of  this  “completely  serious  suspense  story”  would  have  to  be  a
“nightmare comedy” with the unusually long title Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love  the  Bomb.  The archival  record tells  a  complex,  indeed convoluted
story about the genesis of this film.11 Towards the end of 1961, Kubrick started working
with Peter George on the (not yet comical) adaptation of Red Alert.12 Apparently, it was
widely known that Kubrick was interested in a nuclear story, because Eugene Burdick
approached  Harris-Kubrick  Pictures  in  December  1961,  sending  them  “[a]  partially
completed  novel  and  outline  of  a  novel  tentatively  entitled Fail-Safe ...  for  your
consideration  in  connection  with  the  potential  purchase  by  you  of  the  world-wide
motion picture and allied rights.”13 Already involved with Red Alert, Kubrick was not
interested in this offer, but immediately recognized the similarities between Fail-Safe
and Red Alert and hence the danger that someone else might pick up the film rights for
Fail-Safe and  produce  a  rival  picture.  In  preparation  of  a  possible  plagiarism  suit,
Kubrick sent Burdick and his co-author Harvey Wheeler, via registered mail, a copy of
Red Alert, “to which we own the exclusive world-wide motion picture and allied rights,”
as well as “other literary materials which we have heretofore prepared relative to our
theatrical  motion picture  project.”14 This  protected  Kubrick  against  later  claims  by
Burdick and Wheeler that he had stolen their material, and also helped to establish the
fact  that  the  two  authors  had  indeed  been  familiar  with  Red  Alert  and  also  with
Kubrick’s adaptation before they completed their novel, which in turn would help to
prepare a plagiarism suit against them. 
10 Kubrick’s worry about competition from a film version of Fail-Safe probably contributed
to the decision he and George took in March 1962 not to adapt Red Alert after all, but to
develop  a  whole  new  story  for  their  film,  centering  on  a  nuclear  strategist  who
eventually came to be called Dr. Strangelove.15 Nevertheless, in May Kubrick strongly
encouraged George to take legal action against Burdick and Wheeler, once “the actual
proofs of the book are available to be read.”16 Surprisingly, Kubrick reverted back to the
adaptation of Red Alert in July and August, incorporating various aspects of the story of
the nuclear strategist, not least his name and also the story’s comical tone.17 At this
point, it was certain that Kubrick’s film would overlap significantly with Fail-Safe, and it
is entirely possible that Kubrick was already planning to exploit this overlap and the
likely  law  suit  for  publicity  purposes  (instead  of  asking  his  financial  backers  to
neutralize the competition by buying the rights to the forthcoming novel). Fail-Safe was
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first serialized in the Saturday Evening Post and then published as a book in October
1962, and, helped perhaps by the Cuban Missile Crisis, became a bestseller.18 In the light
of the novel’s success, a film adaptation seemed unavoidable, and by November Kubrick
and George were preparing a plagiarism suit.19 At the same time, they finally found a
distributor  when  Columbia  took  over  the  project  from  Seven  Arts.20 Then,  on  7
February 1963, Variety announced that the American Congress of Exhibitors (ACE) and
the Entertainment Corp. of America (ECA), two recently formed production companies,
had joined forces to adapt Fail-Safe and planned to have the film “ready for release in
mid-August,”  thus  coinciding  with  the  release  date  Kubrick  envisioned  for  Dr.
Strangelove.21 A few days later,  an ECA executive told the Hollywood Reporter that  he
“does not think Fail-Safe will conflict with Columbia’s upcoming Dr. Strangelove, [and]
pointed out that one is a serious story and the other a comedy treatmen.”22 However,
the  adjacent  article  in  the  Hollywood  Reporter reported  that  Stanley  Kubrick,  Peter
George and Columbia had just “sued to prevent [ECA] from proceeding with plans to
film Fail-Safe ... charging copyright infringement and unfair competition.” Indeed the
suit aimed at preventing Burdick, Wheeler and their publishers as well as ECA from
“marketing” (here meaning “publicizing”) the novel and the production of a film based
on it.23 What is more, Kubrick et al were seeking damages “plus all profits from these
unfair practices.”24
11 Kubrick  explained  the  thinking  behind  these  harsh  measures  in  an  interview  with
Variety published on 27 February 1963: Not knowing much—or indeed anything—about
Red  Alert,  “people  are  asking  me  why  I  am  copying  that  story  [Fail-Safe]  and  not
crediting it. That is why I must take action.”25 The article reported that, according to
Kubrick, “even if ECA did not make a film version of Fail-Safe the presence of the book
itself would harm his own personal reputation and possibly affect the public desire to
see the film.” As we saw at the beginning of this essay, Kubrick was in fact very happy
about the publicity his dispute with ECA generated for his forthcoming film, and he
took the success of Fail-Safe as a good omen for the box office potential of Dr.
Strangelove. In the end, the plagiarism suit against ECA was settled out of court when
Columbia took over the production of Fail-Safe from ECA in April 1963. According to the
Wall  Street  Journal,  “[a]  Columbia  spokesman  said  that  [the]  company  is  no  longer
worried about plot similarities of Fail-Safe and Dr. Strangelove ... since the company now
can control the release date of both.”26 
12 In order to get Kubrick’s agreement to the settlement, the distributor guaranteed that
Fail-Safe would not be released “prior to the expiration of six ... months after the release
... of Strangelove or June 1 [1964], whichever date shall be later.”27 In this way, Fail-Safe–
which was  eventually  released  in  October  1964  to  considerable  critical  acclaim but
without  much  financial  success28–could  not  damage  the  box  office  performance  of
Kubrick’s film.  Indeed,  later  on  Kubrick  thought  that,  as  far  as  re-releases  were
concerned,  Fail-Safe might  actually  help  Dr.  Strangelove.  In  April  1965,  he  wrote  to
Columbia, “I do have one rather bizarre idea ... What about a double bill ... with Fail-
Safe? ...  [I]t  would be one of  the most talked about combinations in film history.”29
While I am not sure whether this double bill ever came to pass, the developments I have
reconstructed  here  demonstrate  that  a  key  objective  of  Kubrick’s  (and  Columbia’s)
thinking about the marketing of Dr. Strangelove was to neutralize the commercial threat
posed by a, in many ways, quite similar film. 
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13 One might have expected (like the ECA spokesman referred to above) that, in the light
of the obvious generic differences between the two films (drama versus comedy), direct
competition  would  not have  been  regarded  as  such  a  big  issue.  However,  Kubrick
always regarded Dr. Strangelove as a comedy and a suspense drama, and aimed to market
it as both.
 
Marketing Dr. Strangelove: Publicity, Advertising and
Theatrical Release
14 In  the run-up to  the much-publicized release  of  Lolita in  June 1962,  Harris-Kubrick
Pictures  issued  a  press  release  announcing  their  next  project.30 It  quotes  Stanley
Kubrick who described the as yet untitled film as “a satirical comedy about the Bomb. …
We chose to tell our story this way as a reaction to the stupefying reverence with which
the subject has been approached in the past.” At this point, the fact that the film dealt
with a serious subject–arguably the most serious subject of all–in a comical fashion was
seen  as  the  project’s  most  distinctive  feature.31 This  was  also  emphasized  in  the
comments Kubrick made to New York Post columnist Archer Winsten in July; Winsten
reported, “For the past three years he has read everything he could find on nuclear
warfare…. [Dr. Strangelove] will, in his own words, be a satirical comedy of Kafka-ish,
nightmarish mood.”32 After Columbia had taken over the project in November 1962, the
distributor’s first press release mentioned the film’s title, its source novel and its main
star (Peter Sellers), yet placed most emphasis on the filmmaker: “[Stanley Kubrick] will
direct from his own screenplay … [He has been] hailed as one of Hollywood’s most
brilliant young directors.”33 Thus, three key selling points were established early on:
the important subject matter (“the Bomb”), its comical treatment and the “brilliant”
director.
15 When,  on  4  January  1963–three  weeks  before  the  start  of  principal  photography–
Kubrick wrote to Columbia to discuss their ideas for the first advertisement for the
film,  he  addressed  the  issue  of  how  to  weigh  serious  subject  matter  and  comical
treatment. He restated the basic principles that had been agreed in a previous meeting
with representatives of the distributor: “The subject matter and plot of the film is the
leverage by which we shall win the sympathy and support of the vast majority of the
world’s press.”34 Referring to the recent success of nuclear-themed novels (Fail-Safe and
Seven Days in May), he added: “we shall win the public in the same manner.” Given the
primacy of the nuclear subject, he reminded Columbia that “[w]e also settled that the
comedy flavor of the film is precisely that – a flavor, and nothing more” (emphasis in
the original). More so than laughter, “[t]he most direct emotional result of the film will
be suspense, excitement, and fascination”. He demanded that the advertisement should
“have the same balance of tone as the film.” In particular, “it is terribly important to
remove the film from [the] ‘a Peter Sellers picture’ category,” because that category
would identify Dr. Strangelove too exclusively with the comedy genre. Although Kubrick
does not mention it here, this emphasis on Sellers would also divert attention from the
fact that Dr. Strangelove was, of course, “a Stanley Kubrick picture”.
16 When the first Dr. Strangelove advertisement was published soon afterwards in Variety, 
Time and other places, Variety commented that, despite some discrepancies, one might
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easily mistake its plot synopsis “as applying to Fail-Safe”; in other words, the film was
presented more as a nuclear thriller than as a comedy.35 The text of the ad read: 
A nightmare comedy in which a psychotic Air Force General triggers an ingenious,
foolproof and irrevocable scheme, unleashing his Wing of B-52 H-bombers to attack
Russia. The President of the United States, unable to recall the aircraft, is forced to
cooperate with the Soviet Premier in a bizarre attempt to save the world.36 
17 The generic  term “comedy” is  here  qualified  (“nightmare”)  in  a  way that  suggests
tension and fear rather than the levity and release of tension usually associated with
laughter, while the adjective “bizarre” indicates that a suspenseful attempt “to save the
world” can give rise to moments of comical detachment.
18 Two internal memos about possible magazine articles to be generated in conjunction
with  the  film’s  release  indicate  that  Kubrick  and  the  marketing  team  (at  his  own
company and at  Columbia)  were unsure about how to deal  with the film’s  political
implications.  There  was  some  anxiety  that  the  film  might  be  perceived  as  “un-
American” due to its “audacity to joke about such official things as the Pentagon”; one
marketing expert suggested in January 1963 that this could be countered by an “an
article on how the old American custom of taking comic pokes at ourselves got lost as
far as the screen is concerned during the McCarthy era,” also by a piece celebrating the
tradition of “social satire” in American cinema.37 There was agreement that Kubrick
himself should very much be at the heart of the publicity for the film, for example by
getting someone to write an article about his distinctive approach to filmmaking; the
above marketing expert wrote: “I would like with this picture to have what amounts to
THE KUBRICK TOUCH emerge as  a  valid  screen commodity” (along the lines,  as  he
pointed out, of Lubitsch, DeMille and Hitchcock). Yet, the filmmaker’s personal views
on political  measures to  be taken about  the nuclear  stalemate should not  be made
explicit, “Stanley’s theme is inspection for the sake of control of arms, not really for
disarmament,” and the best way “to air his views” was to have them expressed by a
sympathetic magazine writer, rather than by Kubrick himself.38 An earlier memo (from
December 1962) also put a lot of emphasis both on comedy (with proposed article titles
such as “Comedy As a Weapon of Social Criticism” and “Anatomy of a Comedy”) and on
the political implications of Dr. Strangelove: “I would suggest that [peace campaigner]
Bertrand Russell is approached for possible articles.”39 This suggestion was crossed out,
most probably by Kubrick himself, presumably because he feared that the impact of the
film would be weakened if it was tied too closely to a particular political stance.40 
19 Before principal photography on the film started towards the end of January, there had
thus already been an extensive discussion about the key selling points to be highlighted
in advertisements and publicity, notably the nuclear theme, comedy and Kubrick. It is
perhaps somewhat surprising that the memos quoted above also introduced sex into
the marketing equation. Since the film’s screenplay included appearances by a scantily
clad female character (in the form of pictures in a Playboy like magazine and in person),
both  memos  suggested  that  the  actress  playing  that  character  should  actually  be
featured in Playboy and other men’s magazines. Sex would indeed become an important
component of the film’s presentation to the public. 
20 From February 1963 onwards, Columbia and Kubrick’s company courted the press. They
issued more press releases, which contained extensive quotations from Kubrick as well
as  background  information  about  the  film.41 In  February  and  March,  Kubrick  gave
interviews for articles in Variety and Queen magazine, and he then published a piece
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under his own name in Films and Filming in June.42 In April, journalists were invited to
the set (at Shepperton Studios in London), so as to entice them to write articles about
the film’s production.43 Some journalists were even provided with copies of the script.44
In the press releases and articles published up to June 1963, Kubrick clearly is the focus
of attention, with many comments on his total control of the production process; the
fact that other people work on the film as well is acknowledged but they are presented
(and present  themselves  in  interview statements)  as  working  for,  rather  than with,
Kubrick.  In  these  texts,  the  filmmaker  is  given  considerable  space  to  outline  his
motivations for making the film (which was to deal with the most important issue of
the day), to comment on the extensive research he had done on the subject of nuclear
war,  to  express  his  personal  belief–shared by  many experts–that  there  was  a  good
chance that nuclear war would actually happen (most likely by accident) in the not too
distant future, and to explain the comical approach he took to the subject (it was the
only way fully to confront the absurdity and terrible danger of the present situation).
Both  Kubrick’s  own  statements  and  the  surrounding  text  (which often  included
references to Red Alert)  tended to focus on the serious subject matter, with comedy
being seen as an innovative, insightful and, it was hoped, impactful way to relate this
subject matter to the audience. 
21 There was, then, a considerable publicity campaign for Dr. Strangelove in the first half of
1963. As we saw at the beginning of this essay, Kubrick had initially been hoping for a
mid-August release, but in March he had accepted that it would take Columbia until the
end of September to get ready. Production delays then made an even later release date
necessary.  The  original  shooting  schedule  from  January  1963  expected  principal
photography (excluding special effects shots) to be completed on 26 April, yet the shoot
took a whole month longer, and effects shots were done as late as June.45 During that
month, the suggested release date was moved twice, first to October and then even
later.46 By October 1963, two endings were being discussed, the first included a huge pie
fight in the war room, the other was the shorter scene that was eventually used in the
film.47 On 1  November, a  telegram announced that,  after  consultation with  various
people,48 Kubrick  had  finally  arrived  at  a  decision:  “Pie  sequence  out.” 49 In  mid-
November, there was a plan to premiere the film in a London cinema on 12 December,
yet it took extra negotiation time to get an “A” (rather than the highly restrictive “X”)
certificate from the British Board of Film Censors; the certificate was only issued on 9
January 1964.50 The American Production Code Administration also issued its Seal of
Approval  as  late  as  2  January 1964.51 A  memo from 18 December 1963 had advised
Columbia “publicity managers” in various countries that “[i]n the United States the
film is opening in 300 key situations between January 22-29, and the local efforts are
being backed up by a huge national television campaign of approximately $ 300,000.”52
Yet even this information did not turn out to be correct, because the actual release date
in the US and the UK was 30 January 1964.53 Final changes to Dr. Strangelove were only
implemented during the first week of its release; under pressure from the US Air Force,
Columbia  decided  to  ship  a  “silent  Roll-up  ‘Disclaimer’  Prologue”  (a  printed  text
starting “It is the stated position of the US Air Force ….”) which was to be added to all
prints of the film.54
22 When it became clear that the film’s release would be delayed considerably, Columbia
and Kubrick prepared for a second round of publicity from November 1963 onwards.
Once  again,  printed  materials  (including  a  voluminous  press  book)  were  made
available,  and  Kubrick  gave  a  series  of  interviews.55 While  the  articles  based  on
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interviews with Kubrick covered the same ground as the ones from spring 1963 (the
main addition being more detailed information about the film itself), Columbia’s press
book, which was addressed both to the press and to exhibitors, included a wealth of
new material. Among this material were numerous quotations from positive reviews of
the film in the American press.56 The most important addition, however, were articles
about the film’s stars (both Peter Sellers and George C. Scott were credited above the
title)  and supporting actors.  This  took into account  the fact  that,  in  general,  press
coverage of Hollywood has always been more focused on stars than on directors. 
23 The film’s sexual dimension also featured prominently in its advertisements. The press
book displayed the designs for a wide range of ads to be placed in newspapers and
magazines. The two main designs revolved around a series of six questions. In one case,
these were superimposed on the drawing of a bomber fleet; the nuclear-themed first
question (“Why did US H-Bombers attack Russia?”) was here followed by the highly
sexualized question “Why did Dr. Strangelove want ten women for each men?”57 The
other design used six panels, each containing a publicity still of the film’s character
that is referred to in the accompanying question, starting with a picture of Sterling
Hayden playing  General  Ripper  and  the  question  “Why did  General  Jack  D.  Ripper
unleash his H-Bombers to attack Russia?” The second and fourth panel featured Tracy
Reed. In one only her naked legs are seen, next to George C. Scott, “Where was General
‘Buck’ Turgidson when the Hot-Line rang?” The fifth panel shows her on the phone in
revealing clothes, “Why did Miss ‘Foreign Affairs’ phone the Pentagon War Room?” A
“press book insert” featured “an alternate campaign … [which] now has been tested
around the country and has proven tremendously successful.” The main design for this
campaign  featured  a  scantily  clad  Tracy  Reed  surrounded  by  smaller  pictures  of
General Ripper,  Dr.  Strangelove and others,  accompanied by the question about Dr.
Strangelove’s demand of ten women for each man, or the exclamation: “Ten women for
each man!” The tagline used in these ads–“the hot-line suspense comedy” or “the wild
hot-line suspense comedy” (my emphasis)–also had vaguely sexual undertones (“wild,”
“hot”), yet, of course, as with the ads in general, the emphasis was on the fact that the
film dealt with a serious subject in a both suspenseful and comical fashion. Kubrick’s
name is not very prominent in the ads; it  is inserted, in comparatively small print,
between the name of the two stars and the film’s title, and also appears, again in small
print, twice at the bottom of the ad. 
24 The press book also listed the various trailers available for Dr. Strangelove ranging from
a 10 second “teaser trailer” for television to a theatrical trailer over three minutes long,
and  describes  them  as  “[p]robably  the  wildest  ever  devised  for  a  motion  picture,
utilizing a system of quick cuts in all three creative areas–film, sound and dialogue–
with a number of different voices”. Indeed, most of the shots last for only a fraction of a
second, flashing a word (or part of a word) or providing a glimpse of a scene from the
film.58 The words shown in rapid succession on screen add up to the long title of the
film and to questions similar to those used in the ads. Serious moments from the film
are used as well as comical ones, but the frantically rhythmic editing in combination
with childish sounding music clearly emphasize comedy rather than suspense. It is also
worth noting that a bikini-clad Tracy Reed makes several appearances while the last
three  words  of  the  film’s  title  (“love  the  bomb”)  are  spoken  by  a  (comically
exaggerated) sexy female voice. An effort is made to highlight Kubrick’s name at the
very  beginning  of  the  trailer  both  through  printed  words  (“A  Stanley  Kubrick
Production”) and pictures of the director being flashed on the screen, but overall the
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actors are of course much more prominent. Thus, the ads and trailers did not maintain
the strong focus of the earlier publicity on Kubrick and the serious subject matter he
was dealing with, and instead fore-grounded stars, comedy and indeed sex.
 
Conclusion
25 In January 1963, after several years of research on the subject of nuclear war and over a
year of script development, Stanley Kubrick finally started principal photography on
Dr.  Strangelove.  From the beginnings of his film career in the early 1950s,  Kubrick -
usually working closely with various collaborators,  notably James Harris -  had been
involved in all aspects of film production, from finding source material and finance to
making deals with distributors (with one exception all of these deals where with major
Hollywood studios). In the process he had learnt to promote himself, the projects he
had in development and the films he completed to financiers, distributors, the press
and cinema audiences. Dr. Strangelove was the second of his films financed by Seven
Arts, a major new force in film production, but it was sold to Columbia in November
1962. Following on from an initial press release about his new film project earlier in
1962,  after  November  1962  Kubrick  and  the  marketing  team  he  employed,  in
collaboration with Columbia, embarked on the preparation and execution of a complex
marketing campaign. While the film was shot from January to May 1963 (with special
effects work lasting until June), print advertisements were prepared and released, press
releases were issued, journalists and editors were courted (with a view of getting them
to write and publish articles about the film), and Kubrick gave interviews to the press.
The main focus of this campaign was Kubrick himself,  the extraordinary filmmaker
who had taken on the biggest issue of the day and had decided that only a comical
treatment  could  do  it  justice.  Because  of  this  focus,  Kubrick  and  his  team  were
particularly worried about a rival project entitled Fail-Safe, which also dealt with the
subject  of  nuclear  war (albeit  in  a  non-comical  fashion).  From the moment he had
learnt  about  this  project  (in  December  1961)  Kubrick  appears  to  have  made
preparations for  a  possible  plagiarism suit  which would eliminate this  competition.
After several twists and turns, this objective was achieved when Columbia took over
Fail-Safe in  April  1963 and assured Kubrick that  it  would be  released long after  Dr.
Strangelove.
26 Columbia also accommodated Kubrick’s wish, expressed as early as March 1963, for a
wide  release  of  Dr.  Strangelove supported  by  a  national  TV  advertising  campaign.
However, the “heat” that Kubrick felt had been generated by the very public “dispute”
about Fail-Safe early in 1963,  had long dissipated when–after substantial  production
delays and several last-minute changes–Dr. Strangelove was finally released in the US
and the UK at the end of January 1964. In the run-up to this delayed release, there had
been  a  second  round,  starting  in  November  1963,  of  courting  the  press,  giving
interviews,  handing  out  material  for  the  press  and  exhibitors,  and  paying  for
advertisements. All of this was accompanied by a wide range of trailers being shown on
television  and  in  cinemas.  In  contrast  to  the  first  flourishing  of  the  marketing
campaign in the early months of 1963, the emphasis–especially of the ads and trailers–
was now more on comedy and sex than on suspense and serious subject matter, on
stars rather than on the filmmaker. 
“To prevent the present heat from dissipating”: Stanley Kubrick and the Marke...
InMedia, 3 | 2013
10
27 How successful was this marketing strategy? While there is no space here to offer a
detailed discussion of the press discourse about Dr. Strangelove, we can note that in line
with the overall objective of Kubrick and his marketing team (which was to generate
interest in the film), there were a lot of articles about the film in the American press
from spring 1963 onwards.59 The main focus of these articles,  and also of the many
reviews published in January and February 1964, was on Kubrick, on the film’s serious
and  topical  subject  matter,  and  on  its  unusual,  comedic  approach  to  this  subject
matter–once again, this is perfectly in line with the themes highlighted in the film’s
marketing from spring 1963 onwards.60 At the same time, a considerable amount of the
writing about Dr. Strangelove at the beginning of 1964 focused on Sellers (who played
three  different  parts  in  the  film)  and  also  on  Tracy  Reed,  who  plays  a  bikini-clad
secretary (a publicity still showing her in this outfit found wide usage), which reflected
the particular  emphasis  on stars,  comedy and sex in the marketing materials  from
autumn 1963 onwards.61 
28 The film received praise from the majority of critics, several declaring it to be one of
the best American movies of recent years and an important contribution to the public
debate about nuclear weapons; however, it also was the target of political attacks from
some film critics and other commentators, which in turn provoked a vigorous defense
of the film by its supporters.62 In addition, the film was a success at the box office; by
the end of 1964 it had earned $ 4.15 million in rentals in the US, and was listed by
Variety as the fourteenth highest grossing film of the year.63
29 Judging by the film’s critical and commercial success, the marketing campaign can be
said to have worked well. However, it is, of course, by no means the only, or even the
main, reason for the film’s success. After all, although they are primed by publicity and
advertising, film reviewers and audiences ultimately respond to the qualities of the film
itself, not to the qualities of posters, trailers etc. Marketing can attract attention to the
film, but it cannot make viewers like it. This is an important caveat, which is easily
forgotten  in  marketing  studies.  No  matter  how  much  effort  distributors  and
filmmakers  like  Stanley  Kubrick  put  into  the  marketing  of  their  films,  their  main
financial  and  creative  investments  are  focused  on  film production.  Thus,  marketing
research needs to be modest in the claims it makes about the contribution of marketing
to a film’s success or failure.
30 A  final  point  concerns  the  national  dimension  of  the  marketing  campaign  for  Dr.
Strangelove. One has to be cautious about the importance of Columbia’s willingness to
invest  money  in  television  advertising  and  advertisements  reaching  a  nation-wide
audience (through the TV networks or national magazines). After all, the massive press
book for the film was full of advice about what exhibitors could and should do locally,
including  the  placing  of  ads  and  trailers  in  local  media.  In  addition,  Kubrick  and
Columbia organized a large number of preview screenings, which an internal memo
identified  as  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  film’s  box  office  performance:  “The
fantastic  success  of  Dr.  Strangelove in  England  and  America  is  largely  due  to  the
intensive screening program the picture received many weeks in advance of opening.”
64 This program had initially been scheduled for November 1963, but, judging by the
letters  Kubrick  received  in  response  to  these  previews,  the  vast  majority  of  the
screenings  took  place  from January  onwards.65 The  screenings  were  invitation-only
events,  involving  the  press,  opinion  leaders,  prominent  members  of  the  various
communities in which they were organized and indeed anyone who might spread the
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word, the idea being that the people seeing the film this way would talk to others about
it and thus prepare the way for its commercial release: “we want to penetrate to the
greatest possible depth and get word-of-mouth going. Hold one for leading doctors, one
for leading lawyers,  one for  cab drivers,  barbers  and beauticians.”66 This  raises  the
possibility that “heat” was generated at the local rather than the national level,  by
members of local communities rather than by mass media. Without further research,
however, it is difficult to know to what extent this was indeed the case.
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ABSTRACTS
Making extensive use of archival sources, most notably from the Stanley Kubrick Archive at the
University of the Arts London, this article examines the production history and marketing of Dr.
Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and the Love the Bomb (1964), a film based on Peter
George’s 1958 novel Red Alert. The focus is on the complex relationship between Kubrick and the
people behind a rival  project,  Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler's nuclear thriller Fail-Safe
which was published in 1962 and eventually released as a film a few months after Dr. Strangelove
in  1964.  The  article  also  outlines  two  major  efforts  to  promote  Kubrick's  forthcoming  film
through press releases and a press book, interviews, contacts with editors and journalists, paid
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advertisements as well  as theatrical and television trailers.  The initial  promotional campaign
took place in the first  half  of  1963 and fore-grounded the film's director,  its  serious,  topical
theme and the unusual, comical treatment of that theme. The second campaign, which started in
November 1963 and was necessitated by delays in the film’s production and release, placed more
emphasis than the first one on comedy; it also fore-grounded sex and the film's stars, especially
Peter Sellers.
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